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‘I’m Just a Mathematician’: Why and How Mathematicians
Collaborated with Military Ballisticians at Gaˆvre
David Aubin
Abstract. This chapter examines the way in which mathematicians were led
to contribute to ballistic studies in France during World War I. It pays special
attention to the French Navy’s Gaˆvre Experiments Commission first estab-
lished in 1829, where University Professor Jules Haag, Navy Engineer Maurice
Garnier and high school teacher Ose´e Marcus jointly developed a new method
for computing ballistic trajectories (the so-called GHM method). It highlights
the difficulties and successes encountered by mathematicians when they ap-
proached a military culture that was already mathematically sophisticated. It
reviews briefly the history of ballistics at Gaˆvre before the First World War to
understand the bitter feeling among artillerymen serving on the front about
the inadequacies of their ballistic tables. In a final part, the technical con-
tributions made by mathematicians, their experimental practices, and their
efforts to disseminate their results are examined. A focus on various tensions:
between civilians and those in the military, between theory and experiment,
between frontlines and rearlines, serves as a means to understand the value of
the contributions of mathematicians to the war effort.
On September 18, 1915, Jules Haag (figure 1), a young professor of rational me-
chanics from the University of Clermont-Ferrand, wrote to his old mentor, Professor
Paul Appell, in Paris. Mobilizedin a non-fighting unit of the Army, Haag was in
charge of overseeing a workshop of the Michelin Tyre Company that produced am-
munition for the celebrated 75-mm cannon. Asked to compute ballistic trajectories
for a new airplane bomb design called “bombe Michelin,” he first tried, as he wrote,
to apply “the artillerymen’s classical methods.”1 Having computed logarithms for
three half-days in order to construct the required curves, Haag spent the little time
he could spare to try to improve the methods. Rather surprisingly—since ballis-
tics was, after all, a sensitive matter that the Academy had expressly indicated
it wanted to study further for the benefit of the French Army—but luckily, as we
will see, the short paper Haag wrote up and sent to Appell was published a week
In the writing of this chapter, I used documents provided to me by Ce´cile Aguillaume, June
Barrow-Green, Alain Carrie`re, Claudine Fontanon, Se´bastien Gauthier, He´le`ne Gispert, Catherine
Goldstein, and Anne-Sandrine Paumier, whom I wish to thank here for their kind help. I would
also like to thank the members of the WWI study group at the Institut de mathe´matiques de
Jussieu, as well as Patrice Bret and Pierre Mounier–Kuhn. This work was supported in part by
the French Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
1“Les me´thodes classiques des artilleurs” [Academy of Sciences, Haag to Appell, September
18, 1915; pochette de se´ance, September 27, 1915]. All translations are mine.
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Figure 1. Jules Haag as correspondent to the Academy of Sci-
ences. With permission of the Acade´mie des sciences–Institut de
France.
later in the Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des se´ances de l’Acade´mie des sciences
[hereafter CRAS ] [Haag 1915a].2
Characteristically for a scientist in the first months of World War I, Haag felt
that his skills were not used to their fullest extent. His superiors apparently showed
no interest in the results he was sending Appell: “In their eyes,” Haag complained,
“I am just a mathematician, without practical use other that serving as a computing
machine when the occasion arises.” A mere sergeant [mare´chal des logis], Haag had
been barred from the local branch of the Commission of Inventions, since only
2Two more papers on ballistics would then be published by Haag in the same year [Haag
1915b, Haag 1915c]. Some context about the work of the Michelin Company in WWI can be
found in [Chapeaux 2006], pp. 145–146. The first planes produced by Michelin (in collaboration
with the Breguet Company) were delivered in July 1915. On Jules Haag (1882–1953), see [Broglie
1953, Mesnage 1953, Chaˆtelet & Chazy 1955, Meyer 1989].
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officers (or civilians) could sit on it.3 His only recourse, he explained, was to study
a bit of ballistics in his spare time and wish that one would let him devote more
time to it. He admitted that this might have no immediate effect in helping to
“drive out the Germans,” but “the questions I am asked, without being told more
about the mysterious studies that give rise to them” made him suspect that his
contribution might indeed be directly pertinent to the war effort.4
Less than a month later, on October 12, 1915, the professional ballistician,
General Prosper-Jules Charbonnier (1882–1936) (fig. 2), sent a memo to his supe-
riors calling attention to the tremendous ballistic effort that war operations now
demanded. A Navy officer trained at the E´cole polytechnique who had served in
Africa and in the Far East, Charbonnier was at the time President of the so-called
Commission d’expe´riences d’artillerie navale de Gaˆvre, which was both a proving
ground and the main military body in charge of ballistic computations for the
French Navy and Army. In his memo, President Charbonnier explained that his
overworked personnel were now unable to face the huge quantity of experiments
and computations the War Ministry asked them to carry out. Acknowledging that
most artillerymen were, of course, otherwise busy on the battlefields, he noted that
university professors possessed an “intellectual and professional training that would
quickly make them useable by the Commission for computations and even experi-
ments.” A regular reader of the Comptes rendus, Charbonnier put forward Haag’s
name as a likely candidate.5 A fortnight later, on October 29, 1915, the mathe-
matician left Clermont-Ferrand to reach his new assignment post at Gaˆvre, near
the seaport of Lorient in Brittany [SHD–Terre, 6–Ye-17966, Haag’s military file].
As a result of Charbonnier’s memo, a dozen mathematicians, physicists, and
astronomers would join the Gaˆvre Commission over the course of the war, in-
cluding Albert Chaˆtelet (1883–1960), Georges Valiron (1884–1955), Joseph Kampe´
de Fe´riet (1893–1982), and Arnaud Denjoy (1884–1974). The work they did at
Gaˆvre was part of the establishment of new theoretical foundations for computing
in exterior ballistics. New experimental methods for studying ballistics were also
pursued, while the astronomer and future director of the Paris Observatory, Ernest
Esclangon (1876–1954), carried out much praised work on sound-ranging, that is,
the localization of enemy batteries by an analysis of the sound waves they emit-
ted.6 Other prominent mathematicians such as Henri Lebesgue (1875–1941), E´mile
3A promotion to the rank of Second Lieutenant [sous-lieutenant ] in the artillery had indeed
been considered in favor of Haag and rejected. On the Commission, see [Roussel 1989] as well as
the contribution by David Aubin, He´le`ne Gispert, and Catherine Goldstein to this volume.
4“Je ne suis, a` leurs yeux, qu’un mathe´maticien, sans utilite´ pratique autre que celle de
servir, quand l’occasion se pre´sente, de machine a` calculer”; “Cela ne serait peut-eˆtre d’aucune
utilite´ pratique pour chasser les Allemands. Cependant, les questions qu’on me pose, sans
m’initier davantage aux myste´rieuses recherches qui les font naˆıtre, pourraient bien laisser sup-
poser le contraire.” All quotes come from [Academy of Sciences, Haag to Appell, September 18,
1915; pochette de se´ance, September 27, 1915; my emphasis]. The misuse of scientific personnel
at the start of World War I is a common theme among contemporary scientists and historians.
For reviews, see [Kevles 1978, Hartcup 1988, Aubin & Bret 2003], and references therein.
5Charbonnier to the Minister (October 12, 1915), quoted in [Patard 1930, p. 274]. It is not
known whether Charbonnier was in contact with Appell.
6Although it properly belonged to the field of ballistics at the time, sound ranging will not
be examined in detail here. On this topic, see esp. [Schiavon 2003a, Schiavon 2003b]. See also
[Jones 1921–1922, Kevles 1969, Palazzo 1999], as well as other chapters in this volume by June
Barrow-Green and by the present author.
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Figure 2. Colonel, later General Prosper-Jules Charbonnier pon-
dering a ballistic problem on the beach of Gaˆvre, undated. From
[Patard 1930, p. 253].
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Borel (1871–1956) and Paul Montel (1876–1975) took part in ballistic research and
enrolled several mathematics teachers in their effort.
Exterior ballistics was one of the few areas where French mathematicians truly
were able, as mathematicians, to play a prominent part in World War I. This chapter
examines the way in which young mathematicians such as Haag were drawn into
military work at a time when the general belief was that there was no better way for
them to contribute to the war effort than by fighting on the front. As the 22-year
old Pierre Abeille wrote in his last letter to his parents:
Shame on intellectuals who fail to understand that they have . . .
the sacred duty of putting their arms and chests in the same loca-
tion as the arms and chests of their brothers. . . . To us, the privi-
leged, the guardians of tradition, the transmitters of the Ideal, [the
duty] of risking our lives and happily sacrificing ourselves for the
preservation, the extension, the exaltation of all this beauty, of all
this pride that we are the first to feel and to take advantage of.7
Historians have shown that in all belligerent countries the exact contours of
research scientists’ participation in the defense effort were far from being clearly
delineated in 1914 and that many of them did not survive the first years of the war.8
Most historians’ accounts of the war work of mathematicians and scientists often,
if not always, focus on the stories told by surviving scientists themselves. Most,
therefore, view scientists’ contributions on their own terms. But I would like to
argue that to understand correctly the value of such contributions, it is necessary
to widen the scope of our investigations. One needs to have a clear view of the
military demands from the points of view both of general staffs and of men in the
field. One also needs to pay special attention to the military technical structures
that existed before the outbreak of the war to see why officers serving in these
structures felt the need to enlist civilian expertise.
I want to argue that the incorporation of university mathematicians into mili-
tary research structures was neither preordained nor straightforward. One may well
argue that some mathematical knowledge has always been mustered in warfare.9
But before 1914 there also seems to have been a widespread feeling that profes-
sional mathematicians—that is, the university professors teaching and carrying out
research in mathematics—had little to do with it.10
In the United States, Princeton University mathematician Oswald Veblen, de-
spite his enthusiasm for war service, had difficulties finding a place where he could
apply his mathematical skills. But he quickly found a befitting assignment at the
7A public servant, Sergeant Abeille had volunteered for active duty and was killed on No-
vember 12, 1914 in Vingre´, Aisne. His letter, dated September 26, 1914, is repr. in [Foch 1922,
p. 13].
8For France, see [Roussel 1989], [Aubin & Bret 2003], & [Galvez-Behar 2008].
9On the history of mathematics and war, see among others [Mehrtens 1996, Booß-Bavnbek
& Høyrup 2003, Steele & Dorland 2005]. On the WWI period especially, see [Siegmund-Schultze
2003].
10Even after the war, this feeling remained entrenched. A reviewer of a book on the history
of ballistics [Charbonnier 1928a]—“the value of whose results I was able to appreciate for more
than four years and the perfection of which I have known without joy”—expressed his surprise
at encountering the names of the “greatest perhaps of the history of science: Galileo, Huygens,
Newton, Euler, among others” [L.G. 1931, pp. 376–377].
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Aberdeen Proving Ground, which was the U.S. counterpart of the Gaˆvre Commis-
sion. According to the internal history of this institution, “Exterior ballistics—that
part of the science dealing with the behaviour of projectiles in flight—underwent
a major revolution during World War I.”11 Military historians in the U.S. easily
acknowledged that scientists were major players in this revolution: Forest Ray
Moulton, an astronomer from the University of Chicago, was the first head of the
Ballistic Branch, and even though the computation of firing tables followed stan-
dard European procedures, their implementation and improvement were the work
of three mathematicians linked to Princeton (Oswald Veblen, Gilbert Ames Bliss,
and Thomas Hakon Gronwall). Although historians assessed that World War I
had little effect on the postwar development of mathematics in the U.S., which re-
mained characterized by the high value placed on abstractness, the field of ballistics
appeared as a paradigmatic example of a research problem hitherto unsolvable by
military structures and that only university scientists’ special skills could solve.12
Likewise, the history of British ballistics has been centered on the scientist, the
team assembled by the Cambridge biophysicist Archibald Vivian Hill and involving
the mathematicians John E. Littlewood, Edward Arthur Milne, and Ralph Howard
Fowler, the last two being definitively turned away from prior involvement in pure
mathematics.13
In France, by contrast, the situation seemed rather more complex and perhaps
also more interesting. It was more complex because for a least a century most mil-
itary officers had received their first academic training at the E´cole polytechnique,
before going on with their career as military officers. As a result, they often had the
mathematical sophistication required for efficiently tackling the main problems of
ballistics. Indeed French military ballisticians had a long acquaintance with the use
of advanced mathematical techniques, but also physical and chemical theories and
experimental procedures, to tackle every aspect of the problem of artillery firing.14
The French situation was also more complex because many more mathematicians
were involved almost from the start in ballistic research, joining various military
institutions that already possessed a high degree of expertise that civilians—no mat-
ter how savant—did not necessarily have. The circumstances under which civilian,
or formerly civilian, mathematicians were drawn to the problem and the specific
contributions they were able to bring to it therefore need to be assessed from the
point of view of the encounter of people coming from various perspectives. This en-
counter was forced upon them by the special circumstances of war and the specific
demands that emerged from frontline fighting experience.
In the rearlines, mathematicians and ballisticians engaged in the production of
range tables and computing procedures, which were hybrid entities straddling the
various worlds of the fighting artilleryman, the military specialist, and the academic
11[U.S. n.d., p. 3]. The military work of American mathematicians is considered in the
contribution by Deborah Kent, Della Fenster, and Thomas Archibald in this volume. On Veblen,
see also the introduction to this volume. For contemporary assessments of American methods by
the French, see [Schwartz 1927, Dodier & Valiron 1927].
12For an assessment of the lack of effect of World War I on mathematics in the U.S., see
[Parshall & Rowe 1994, p. 444]. This view was nuanced in [Parshall 2000].
13See [Smith 1990, Hill n.d.]. The war work of the Cambridge mathematicians is discussed
in June Barrow-Green’s contribution to this volume.
14On the E´cole polytechnique, see the contribution of Jean-Luc Chabert and Christian Gilain
to this volume.
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mathematician. In so far as it was a hybrid product hastily put together in a time
of emergency, the new ballistics that came out of the First World War only found
its place with difficulty within institutional and epistemological frameworks after
the Armistice. While military strategists insisted on the renewed importance of the
artillery in modern warfare, resistances persisted to the complete transformation
of ballistics into a branch of applied mathematics. From the early 1920s onward,
civilian scientists were, however, associated to the Gaˆvre Commission on a perma-
nent basis. Almost nonexistent before the war, the relationship between university
mathematicians and military research bodies was made permanent.
Seeing in the research bodies hastily put in place during the war by military
as well as by civil authorities a prefiguration of the state-controlled system of sci-
ence funding that was fully developed during the Cold War, historians of science
have mostly focused on the scientists’ place in new organizations such as boards of
inventions and research councils and turned a blind eye to older military research
traditions.15 Our look at French ballistic research shows that scientists’ involvement
in these institutions in 1914–1918 resulted in their lasting association with military
research structures that preexisted the start of the First World War and endure to
this day.16
1. Tradition, the Scientific Method and the “Gaˆvrais Virtues”
Early in the 20th century, Gaˆvre was a small fishing village sitting at the tip of
a long and thin peninsula that separates the harbor of Lorient from the Atlantic
Ocean on the south shore of Brittany.17 On the isthmus connecting it to the main-
land, a proving ground was established in 1829, when the Gaˆvre Commission was
created by the Navy Minister. The Commission was composed of military officers
and engineers, coming in proportions that varied over the years from the naval,
colonial, and sometimes land, artilleries. Its main objective was to carry out all
types of research connected to gunnery, including experimentation with cannons,
rockets and guns, with powder and with projectiles. Their effect on various types
of steel plates was also investigated. But most of all, the Gaˆvre Commission was
famous for its expertise in ballistics, both interior and exterior, both theoretical
and experimental. Since its foundation, its principal task was the compilation of
numerical tablesgiving the range as a function of the initial shooting angle (or line
of departure) for each new cannon model introduced in the Navy.
When he reached the Gaˆvre proving ground, Haag was hardly stepping into
virgin territory. There, he and other civilian scientists found cannons of all sizes,
cranes, railways, telegraphic and telephonic lines, chronographs and photographic
cameras, all types of ballistic instruments needed to measure the initial velocity of
projectiles, their power of penetration in steel plates, etc. (figure 3). But above
15On Britain, see [MacLeod & Andrews 1971, Pattison 1983, Hull 1999]. On the U.S., see
[Kevles 1968]. On France, see [Roussel 1989]. On Germany and Italy, see [Mehrtens 1996, Epple
et al. 2005]. A more detailed study of the Italian case is given in Pietro Nastasi and Rossanna
Tazzioli’s contribution to this volume.
16Let us note here that the successor institution of the Gaˆvre Commission, called GERBAM
(Groupement d’e´tudes et de recherches balistiques, armes et munitions), was closed down on
January 1, 2010. Only a naval training center for shooting now remains at the Gaˆvre polygon.
17After much debate, the standard usage today is to write Gaˆvres (with an s at the end).
At the time of the First World War, however, military officials had decided to use Gaˆvre which is
much more common in contemporary documents. I will thus follow the latter usage.
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Figure 3. A View of the Gaˆvre Polygon in the Early 1930s. From
Le centenaire de la Commission de Gaˆvre, Revue maritime et colo-
niale (2nd semester 1930), pp. 233–237; on p. 235.
all, they came into contact with a handful of Navy officers who shared a strong
scientific “ethos” attached to its own tradition and characterized by its own dis-
tinctive values. For mathematicians who were suddenly confronted with them, the
“Gaˆvrais virtues [les vertus gaˆvraises],” as Charbonnier called them, might at first
have been discomforting [Charbonnier 1906, p. 425].18 This is what Le´on Patard,
the official historian of the Gaˆvre Commission at the time he was its President,
alluded to in the following passage written in 1930:
A success of the Naval Artillery during this war, and not the least,
was the use of the good will of all these men, some of whom [were]
eminent savants but little prepared for their new role. Their trust
had to be won; they had to be shown that, while they were not
their equals in the domain of pure science, naval artillery engineers
were able to understand their ideas, discuss their theories, and
answer their objections. One can only infer the tact needed to
subject them to long training courses in routine computing, to
stem their professional attempts at perfecting computing methods
as soon as they got there, to make them comply with the strict
rules of experimentation and observation, and finally to lead them
progressively from the role of auxiliaries to that of collaborators
[Patard 1930, p. 279].19
Charbonnier also insisted on the “scientific-technical” organization put in place
at Gaˆvre, whereby collaborative work was done by “savants and officers.” At Gaˆvre,
“theoreticians remained in close and permanent contact with users” of cannons
[Charbonnier 1929, pp. 27–28]. Le´on Lecornu (1854–1940), a Professor of Mechan-
ics at the E´cole polytechnique, hinted at something similar when he praised the
18The idea that the Gaˆvre “virtues” may be understood in relation to the scientific ethos
was first popularized by [Merton 1942]. More recently, John Ziman suggested that the Mertonian
ethos (which he calls cudos, for Communalism, Universality, Disinterested, Originality, Skepticism)
might have coexisted with an industrial research ethos he called place (for Proprietary, Local,
Authoritarian, Commission, Expertise), which might be closer to the Gaˆvre ethos [Ziman 2000].
19Patard (1872–1963) was President of the Gaˆvre Commission from January 26, 1925 to
February 20, 1931.
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fact that “several science professors transformed by mobilization into improvised
artillerymen, brought a precious collaboration to the professionals: together they
contributed in a large part to the final victory” [Lecornu 1924, p. 38].
Compare this emphasis on collaboration to scientists’ accounts with which his-
torians of science are much more familiar. The general tone used in the latter
makes them fall in one of two categories: while many are self-congratulatory and
emphasize the unique contributions civilian scientists were able to bring to the war
effort, many others are overfull with bitterness, resentment, and acrimony towards
the military authorities’ incompetence and their criminal misuse of the mathemati-
cians’ or of the scientists’ special abilities. An instructive example of the second
attitude can be found in the pamphlet privately published by the physicist and
industrialist, Georges Claude: “Our savants? Ah! if only you knew what was
done of them [ce que l’on a fait d’eux ]! If only you knew their hopes, their efforts,
their struggles, and in the end their powerlessness” [Claude 1919, p. 33].20 By con-
trast, Patard underscored the difficulty faced by the military members of the Gaˆvre
Commission when they endeavored to integrate civilian scientists into their working
procedures. Although Haag was asked to work on the solution of a new problem
(anti-aircraft gunnery) and, in the process, introduced new mathematical methods
at Gaˆvre (error analysis), the main problem, as Patard saw it, lay in containing
scientists’ impatience, acquainting them with the Gaˆvre tradition and making them
comply with entrenched working procedures.
Some scientists seemed to have been quite aware of the fact that they were
stepping on other experts’ turf when they offered their help to military engineers.
Aime´ Cotton (1869–1951) was an established physicist and already recognized by
military officials for having developed, in collaboration with Pierre Weiss (1865–
1940), one of the most successful instruments used in sound-ranging. In 1916,
Cotton wrote General Hubert Gossot (1853–1935), a former President of the Gaˆvre
Commission, to offer his help on the problem of determining the effect of weather
conditions on artillery fire. It is interesting to note the very cautious wording used
by Cotton in his letter: “if you judge that the reflections of a physicist who is
perforce incompetent on many points may be of some interest to you, I put myself
at your disposal to extract from them results that would seem useable and to give
them [the results] a form more easily applicable in practice (relying on the advice
of men of the trade).”21 Clearly, rather than assuming that he knew better, the
physicist placed himself at the disposal of the military and not merely of his country.
Tradition at Gaˆvre was no empty rhetoric. It was the bedrock of its scientific
credibility. One is struck not only by the palimpsest-like manner in which the his-
tory of the Gaˆvre Commission has been written and rewritten on several occasions
by some of the major ballisticians who worked there, but also by the insistence put
on tradition, despite important breaks in the methods and despite rapid changes
in the gunpowder and materials used by artilleries.22 As Charbonnier wrote in
20On Claude, see [Aubin 2003] and [Baillot 2010].
21“Si vous estimez que les re´flexions d’un physicien, ne´cessairement incompe´tent sur bien
des points, pre´sentent quand meˆme quelque inte´reˆt, je me mets a` votre disposition pour en extraire
les re´sultats qui paraˆıtraient pouvoir eˆtre utilise´s et leur donner une forme plus facile a` appliquer
pratiquement (en m’aidant des conseils des gens du me´tier)” [SHD–Terre, 2W292; Cotton to
Gossot, February 8, 1916].
22Besides [Charbonnier 1906] and [Patard 1930] already cited, other insider’s histories of
Gaˆvre are: [Poyen-Bellisle 1889–1893] and [Cre´mieux 1930]. Secondary literature about the Gaˆvre
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1906, Gaˆvre was characterized by its special virtues: “respect for the continuity of
doctrines, freedom of thought, faith in experimentation, [and] patience for long com-
putations and for careful verifications” [Charbonnier 1906, pp. 425–426]. Another
ballistic engineer, Maxime Cre´mieux, would concur in 1930: “beyond all experi-
mental and theoretical investigations, one senses a working method that presided
over the whole: . . . submission to experimental facts, scientific probity, respect of
tradition, minute consideration of details, clarity of deductions, freedom in tech-
nical opinions” [Cre´mieux 1930, p. 145]. Let us be more specific: although it has
remained in the shadows of more public institutions, like observatories and labora-
tories, or institutions recently studied in more details, like factory workshops, Gaˆvre
was one of the main theaters for the development of strict experimental procedures
in the nineteenth century. Indeed, it is probably no exaggeration to say that it was
one of the places where modern procedures for the mathematical and quantitative
testing of theories against experiments were designed and tested on a large scale.23
In ballistics, the comparative merits of empiricism and theory were often discussed
explicitly. Like the observatory, it played a leading role in the slow convergence
between empirical procedures and theoretical approaches derived from Newton’s
first principles.24 “While mathematicians subsequent to Cauchy were usually more
interested in proofs of existence and in functional relations among solutions ob-
tained, than in numerical results, there were already cultivated two fields which
especially called for numerical methods, namely astronomy and ballistics” [Bennett
et al. 1956, p. 61]. While one may contest Bennett’s view of mathematicians on
the ground that the latter did manifest some interest in computation, one cannot
deny the importance of astronomy and ballistics for the history of computing.
After the establishment of the Gaˆvre Commission, it was the Professor of Hy-
drology at the Lorient Naval School, Fe´lix He´lie (1795–1885), who soon assumed
the scientific leadership.25 Starting in 1834, after summers devoted to experimenta-
tion and cannon testings, He´lie alone would carry out all the computations needed
to interpret the experimental results and draft all the reports sent to the Navy
Ministry. A staunch empiricist, he distrusted theories developed from first prin-
ciples, which gave poor results when tested on the proving ground. Charbonnier
thought that, in his work, He´lie showed more patience than originality [Charbon-
nier 1906, p. 413]. In He´lie’s mind, every new range table had to be established
through extensive experimental work, and the laws and formulas derived from this
massive work could hope for no more than an ephemeral existence. In his Traite´
de balistique expe´rimentale, He´lie developed his method: summarize experimental
results by as simple a mathematical formula as possible that should not be applied
outside of the experimental limits used to derive it. He opened this treatise with
the following words:
Commission is however much rarer, but see [Bru 1996], [Seddik-Ameur 2003], and [Mounier-Kuhn
2010, pp.194–195]. On ballistics in France more generally, see also [Belhoste & Lemaˆıtre 1990]
and [Fontanon 2005].
23On the role of the military in scientific research in France in the period preceding the
establishment of the Gaˆvre Commission, see [Bret 2002]. For studies on the history of observatory
techniques in the 19th century, see [Aubin et al. 2010].
24On the history of the observatory in the nineteenth-century, see [Aubin et al. 2010]. On
the importance of computing between theory and practice, see [Warwick 1995].
25On He´lie, see [Delauney 1892] and compare with the history of ballistics at Metz in [Bru
1996].
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The principles of rational mechanics are not sufficient to solve
[all the questions relative to artillery shooting and its effects]; the
forces and resistances at play can only be appreciated through
observation. A treatise on ballistics must therefore be in large
part composed of descriptions and discussions of experiments
whose results are often the only possible demonstration for the
propositions which one may consider as having been established
[He´lie 1865, p. 1].
He´lie’s attitude may in part be explained by the fact that, compared to the aca-
demic setting, the Gaˆvre Commission was never allowed to lose sight of its practical
mission: to produce the knowledge necessary for aiming guns accurately. So, even
when later ballisticians expressed the wish to revalue the role of theory in their
field (see below), they came up with stringent criteria.26 According to the Gaˆvre
ballisticians, a theory was judged satisfactory only in so far as it could be checked
numerically, even if this entailed a considerable amount of work [Charbonnier 1906,
p. 432]. According to Cre´mieux, the Gaˆvrais character was shaped in this period
and entailed an “absolute respect” for carefully documented experimental results
and repugnance toward erasing disagreement between theory and experiment. On
the contrary, all discordances had to be underscored in written reports so that one
knew exactly where methods were in need of improvement [Cre´mieux 1930, p. 149].
This was, Charbonnier insisted, the application of Francis Bacon’s method, which
led to practical prescriptions: (1) never to fire a useless shot; (2) never to fire a nec-
essary shot without having first computed all experimental results expected from
it; and (3) “perform all experiments necessary in the toughest circumstances, that
is such that disagreement between theory and experiment has the greatest chance
of manifesting itself.”27
For theoretical considerations to be put in practice, he added, three precautions
were required:
(1) compute all necessary tables in full, without disdainfully leaving this vul-
gar care to technicians [praticiens];
(2) provide full and detailed numerical examples;
(3) prepare with great care computation skeletons, which can be lithographed
and whose columns are merely left so to speak to be filled out numeri-
cally.28
In short, Charbonnier wrote, the Gaˆvrais character could be summarized as “a
very practical outlook . . . which holds a theory as satisfactory only in so far as it
has been numerically checked, compared to all the known experiments, and when
necessary numerical tables have been computed often at the price of considerable
and off-putting labor an idea of which only those who have themselves executed a
similar task can have” [Charbonnier 1906, p. 432].
In 1915, procedures followed by the Gaˆvre Commission therefore were partic-
ularly stringent. They were solutions adopted over the course of almost a hundred
26Note that this was not only felt at Gaˆvre. See the way in which an engineer in the artillery
branch of the Creusot Factories argues in favor of theory and for the insufficiency of experiments
alone in [Morel 1904, p. 7].
27[Charbonnier 1906, p. 417]. One should here be reminded that in the course of the 19th
century it became increasingly expensive to fire a cannon shot.
28[Charbonnier 1906, p. 432n].
320 DAVID AUBIN
years of confrontation with intricate problems and practical demands from fighting
artillerymen on ships around the world. If these procedures insured the interna-
tional high regard in which results coming out of the Gaˆvre were held, “doctrinal”
thinking, the requirements of efficiency, and respect for hierarchy also rigidified
procedures. Once adopted after extensive series of tests, computing procedures
were rarely changed and then only after much debate. To understand what was
at stake in theoretical and practical ballistics at the time when Haag and his col-
leagues reached the Gaˆvre peninsula, let us now briefly review the status of exterior
ballistics at that time.
2. Exterior ballistics before 1915
Ballistics is a complex science in which theoretical, experimental, and computa-
tional uncertainties always clash with one another. Moreover, technological inno-
vation in cannon and projectile design sometimes increased the complexity of the
problem. The first complication to consider came from the fact that the motion of
a projectile actually involves two very different sets of problems: interior ballistics,
which deals with what happens inside the cannon muzzle, can be tackled mostly
by mobilizing the tools of thermodynamics and chemistry, and exterior ballistics
which is mainly a mechanical and mathematical problem. Both problems, more-
over, require some input from fluid mechanics. It is a remarkable fact that up to
WWI, and beyond, military ballisticians would address both interior and exterior
ballistics, often with an equal degree of competency.
Restricting our attention to exterior ballistics, while the laws of dynamics easily
allowed the determination of the differential equations governing the trajectory of
a projectile through the air, various effects combined to make its general solution
very hard to find. At the beginning of the 20th century, Charbonnier drew inspira-
tion from astronomical methods to introduce a useful distinction that considerably
simplified the presentation of exterior ballistics [Charbonnier 1907].29 “Secondary”
problems, as he called them, were considered perturbations to the “principal” prob-
lem. They were supposed to take into account the effects of the wind, of variations
in atmospheric temperature and pressure, of the wear of the piece, of the pro-
jectile’s spin around its axis, of the earth’s rotation, etc. The principal ballistic
problem therefore amounted to solving an ordinary differential equation, called the





where v is the magnitude, and vx = v cos τ the horizontal component, of the veloc-
ity v of the projectile in the (x, y)-plane, expressed as a function of the uniformly
decreasing angle τ with respect to the horizontal at each point of the trajectory
(figure 4); g is the acceleration due to gravity at the surface of the earth (taken
in first approximation to be constant); c, the so-called “ballistic coefficient” (vary-
ing according to the size and shape of the projectile); and F (v) = f(v)/v2, the
29Many publications give the state of the art in the first decade of the 20th century; see, e.g.:
[Gilman 1905] and [Cranz & Vallier 1913].
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Figure 4. Schematic representation of a projectile’s trajectory,
displaying variables relevant to the hodograph. On this view, taken
from [Adhe´mar 1934, p. 7], two steps in the piecewise integration
method, at angle τ1 and τ2, have been pictured. At a generic point
on the trajectory, the magnitude of the velocity was simply noted
v and the angle with the horizon τ . Courtesy of MIR Library,
Paris.
law of resistance of the air to the motion of the projectile supposed in first-order
approximation to be a function of v only.30
The principal ballistic problem is therefore mathematically equivalent to finding
the solution (or at least a fairly accurate approximation of certain quantities deriv-
able from the solution) of an ordinary differential equation involving some unknown
functions. Issues connected to the resolution of the principal ballistic problem were
of three sorts: (1) how to compute the ballistic coefficient c; (2) what was the exact
form of the air resistance function F (v); and (3) in case these quantities gave rise
to differential equations that were insoluble by formal means, what was the best
method for finding a good approximation of the solution? Although at first sight
the former two questions would seem to be soluble by the tools of fluid mechanics
and the latter to be a purely mathematical problem, all questions were intertwined,
a fact that can be illustrated by recalling that in the first experiments carried out
by the Gaˆvre Commission, before the ballistic pendulum was introduced there, ini-
tial bullet velocities were essentially determined by measuring the range of their
trajectories!31
30Because of its great simplicity, I adapt here Charbonnier’s own presentation in [Charbonnier
1929]. Note however that he also included as another factor the air density H(y) that prior to
WWI was generally taken to be a constant in the principal ballistic problem (corresponding to
low altitude trajectories). When vertical differences in air density were taken into account (as
a secondary problem), an exponential law H(y) = e−hy was usually assumed. A very similar,
equivalent expression is found in [Charbonnier 1906, p. 449].
31Invented by Benjamin Robins in the 18th century, the ballistic pendulum was greatly
improved by the ballisticians of the Metz Artillery School, Guillaume Piobert, Arthur Morin, and
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2.1. Ballistic Coefficient and Air Resistance. At the beginning of WWI,
the Gaˆvre Commission had, under Charbonnier’s leadership, adopted a theoretical
framework and strict computational procedures for dealing with exterior ballistics.
If the practical needs of the artillery were thereby met by the Gaˆvre savants, any
unforeseen innovation modifying shooting parameters would immediately throw
ballisticians into uncharted territory. For most purposes, reliable results seemed to





where ∆0 was the air density on the ground; a and p, respectively, the calibre and
the weight of the projectile and i its “form factor” often considered proportional to
sin γ, with γ the penetrating angle at the tip of the projectile. But all attempts at
securing a theoretical foundation for this formula remained elusive.
As far as the resistance law was concerned, ballisticians first used the Newton
resistance law proportional to the square of the velocity (v2). When rifled bar-
rels were introduced, initial speeds greatly increased and the Alexandre-Hippolyte
Piton-Bressant (1820–1847) resistance law (proportional to v4) was adopted for
a while.32 In the second half of the century, smokeless powder again increased
initial projectile speed. New extensive series of experiments were carried out in
the 1860s by Nikolai Maievski near Saint-Petersbourg in Russia and by Francis
Bashforth with the help of his electric chronographs in Woolwich England. In the
next decades, new evidence from experiments performed from 1879 onward by the
Krupp Company on the Meppen shooting range in Germany and by Colonel Hojel
in Holland in 1884 showed that the resistance law decreased at higher velocity. As
a result the functional form of the law became tremendously complicated. In Italy,
Francesco Siacci (1839–1907) suggested the following expression [Cranz & Vallier
1913, p. 16]:
F (v) = 0.2002v − 48.05 +
√







In 1896, an empirical resistance law was adopted at Gaˆvre: the famous “fonc-
tion de Gaˆvre.” Thousands of numerical results, derived from firing tests with initial
speeds from 400 to 1200 m/s with all calibres and all types of projectiles were used
to determine this function which was presented as a table, as a graph, and, finally,
as an analytic expression introduced by chef d’escadron Demogue [Cre´mieux 1930,
Isidore Didion in the 1840s [Didion 1860, pp. 321–326], [Morin & Tresca 1860, vol. 1, pp. 228–233].
It was adopted by the Gaˆvre Commission in the same decade. On the Metz artillery school, see
[Belhoste & Picon 1996].
32Many other laws f(v) were suggested and used in the 19th century: bv3 by Bashforth;
av2(1 + bv) by Saint-Robert; av2(1 + bv2) by Didion; a + bv by Chapel, etc. See [Charbonnier
1906, p. 444]. A short and simple mathematically-oriented introduction to the question of air
resistance is to be found in [Long & Weiss 1999].
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p. 152].33 According to Haag,34 the function used during WWI had the following
form where the exponential term was introduced by the naval engineer, Maurice
Garnier:






















2.2. Siacci’s Direct-Fire Approximation. Eschewing simple power laws
for the air resistance often meant that resulting differential equations became in-
tractable by formal methods.35 Two types of approximation methods were used
by the Gaˆvre Commission: (1) step-by-step integration methods [in French, calcul
des trajectoires par arc], and (2) approximations derived using the “direct-fire” as-
sumption [in French “tir de plein fouet”]. Let us review how they were successively
adopted by the Gaˆvre Commission for the computation of firing tables.
Step-by-step integration methods, which French ballisticians called the “arc
method,” dated back to Leonhard Euler (1753).36 In this approach, the equation
was solved on a small interval only assuming that the air resistance was quadratic
over the interval. Interest in these methods was given a boost when the second
edition of He´lie’s treatise was published in 1884.37 After the Franco-Prussian War
and the death of He´lie in 1887, the “struggle engaged between traditionalism and
progress was vigorously undertaken” [Charbonnier 1906, p. 416] and ballisticians
at Gaˆvre adopted a more theoretical approach. The second edition of the treatise
received significant contributions from the polytechnician mathematical physicist,
Pierre-Henry Hugoniot (1851–1887), whose inclination for mathematical theories
was much greater than He´lie’s.38 While the work of Bashforth and George Greenhill
in Britain, of Francesco Siacci (1839–1907) in Italy, and of Carl Cranz (1858–1945)
in Germany was renewing the field of ballistics, He´lie and Hugoniot showed that
33The resistance law was first expressed as a numerical table and presented in reports
nos. 1414 and 1429 of the Gaˆvre Commission (March 14 and July 21, 1896), giving log f(v) or
log[f(v)/v2] for values of v from 0 to 1200 m/s; see Table I1 in [Gaˆvre 1916, pp. 3–6]; “Tableaux
ne´cessaires au calcul des trajectoires par arcs successifs” [SHD–Terre, 2W292], and [Bingen 1928,
pp. 20–22]. One finds a graphic representation of the laws and the various experimental trials that
led to it in [Cranz & Vallier 1913, p. 17].
34[Haag 1921, p. 3]. Note that there is a mistake in this function. To reproduce the numerical
data in published tables, the coefficient of the arctangent, and this one alone, should be multiplied
roughly by a factor of 3500.
35During the war, several mathematicians studied conditions to be imposed on F (v) in order
for the hodograph to remain integrable. This is point 2 in the report on ballistics drafted after
the war [Hadamard 1920]. Jules Drach suggested a method using Galois theory in 1914. Denjoy
wrote a report about this method while he was at the Gaˆvre Commission in July 1917. For more
on this, see [Drach 1914], [Drach 1920]. See also the note written by Paul Montel in [Charbonnier
1927, vol. 1, pp. 498–515]. Several notes and letters concerning Denjoy’s role are to be found in
[Academy of Sciences, “Ballistics” file of the “Commission nomme´e pour l’e´tude des questions la
de´fense nationale,”].
36On the early history of exterior ballistics, see [Charbonnier 1929], [Hall 1952], and [Steele
1994].
37Note that while the second edition of the treatise was published by two authors [He´lie &
Hugoniot 1884], the first one had only one [He´lie 1865].
38On the life and work of Hugoniot, see [Che´ret 1990]. A clear offshoot of his ballistic studies,
Hugoniot’s seminal paper on shock compression was published in two parts in the Journal de
l’E´cole polytechnique in 1887 and 1889.
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old step-by-step methods could be as accurate as desired, provided the intervals
chosen were numerous and small enough [He´lie & Hugoniot 1884, vol. 2, p. 289].
After Hugoniot’s untimely death in 1887, Hubert Gossot, also a graduate of the
E´cole polytechnique (1874) who had joined the Naval Artillery Corps, took over the
Gaˆvre Commission.39 In 1887 and 1888 he used the method to compute firing tables
for new 34-cm and 90-mm caliber cannons. At long last, the Gaˆvre Commission
had mastered a method for computing firing tables that was safe, accurate, and
dependable. But it was also time-consuming and, many felt, inelegant: it was “a
computing process, not a theory” [Patard 1930, p. 243].
The Commission thus consented to submit itself deliberately and
for many long years to the boredom of very long, very fastidious
and very inelegant computations using the step-by-step method . . .
because it understood what were the consequences of its liberation
from empirical methods and of the return of ballistics back to its
natural source: possibility a priori of computing any trajectory
from any cannon; extreme reduction of ballistic shots needed to
establish a firing table; . . . exact determination of non observed
elements of the trajectory ([Charbonnier 1906, p. 423]; quoted in
[Patard 1930, p. 243]).
A second group of methods was concurrently developed for approximately solv-
ing the hodograph. The most successful was introduced in 1880 by Siacci whose
treatise was quickly translated into French. The principle of the method was to
replace the velocity v by a pseudo-velocity u defined as [Siacci 1892, p. 47]:
v cos τ = u cosα,
where α, called the angle of projection (or line of departure), corresponded to the
actual initial shooting angle.40 The pseudo-velocity was equal to the velocity only
at the origin and in the descending branch of the trajectory when τ = −α, but in
the case of direct fire when the angle τ was close to zero over the whole trajectory,
the difference between velocity and pseudo-velocity also remained small. Writing
the hodograph equation in terms of the pseudo-velocity u, Siacci found a general
equation for the trajectory [Siacci 1892, p. 49]:










where G was a function that depended on the air resistance law F (u) that was
adopted, but that could be computed, provided four secondary functions J(u),
S(u), D(u) and A(u) defined as follows were computed and tabulated for every
value of u:
39On Gossot, see [Challe´at 1933–1935, vol. 2, p. 314] and [SHD–Terre, 11–Yd–47]. Gossot
was later Central Director of Naval Artillery (1905–1909) and Inspecteur des e´tudes et expe´riences
techniques de l’artillerie from July 1915 to 1917.
40Note that Siacci used θ instead of τ and ϕ instead of α.



















Using the tabulated values of these functions, most elements of a trajectory could be
computed rather quickly, typically in less than twenty to thirty simple operations.
For example, given the value of the pseudo-velocity u at a point on the trajectory
and the initial velocity v0, the x–coordinate of the projectile was simply given by
the formula x = C[D(v0) − D(u)], for a certain constant C. Siacci also relied on
the assumption that a certain variable β was constant and equal to 1. Under this
assumption, the results computed using Siacci’s method remained relatively reliable
in the case of direct fire, that is, provided α < 20◦ [Charbonnier 1907].
To compute deviations due to secondary problems such as the rotation of the
projectile or wind, a few other secondary functions were required, all of which
were computed and tabulated. Written by the ballistician Anne, Gaˆvre reports
from December 23, 1912, and July 28, 1913, contained the required tables. Having
joined the Gaˆvre Commission in 1907, Anne died in October 1921, “worn-out by
the exhausting labor he was submitted to during the war” [Patard 1930, p. 293].
This extensive computing effort was completed and printed in January 1916 [Gaˆvre
1916]. By that time, however, war had made them obsolete!
3. The Mathematical War Viewed from the Front
“One of the surprises of the present war,” the ballistician Emmanuel Vallier (1849–
1921) from the Academy of Sciences wrote in May 1915, “certainly is the great
development of indirect fire” [Vallier 1915, p. 297]. Few indeed had foreseen the
tremendous change of fortune artillery—and as a result ballistics—would undergo
during WWI. To understand the evolution of problems and solutions considered
worthwhile at Gaˆvre, one needs to take into account fighting men’s reactions to
what the Commission had to offer. While it struck the “everyman at war” that
mathematics played a crucial part in his predicament, the way this was translated
in practice is straightforward.41 Indeed, the very usefulness of the mathematical
apparatus for ballistics was drastically questioned. Due to the rapid evolution in
the tactical and strategic use of artillery, commanding officers immediately found
that mathematical support for directing fire was imprecise, confusing, or simply
lacking. At the hostilities’ outbreak, there even seemed to have been a widespread
sentiment among artillerymen that, as a practical science, mathematical ballistics
had failed them and a “conflict arose between artillerymen and their [firing table]
suppliers” [Boissonnet 1920, p. 36].
At a strategic level, it was quickly realized that artillery was to play a major
role in this war. Less than a week after the declaration of war, Captain Lombal
observed that the standard 75-mm cannon adopted by the French Army in 1897
(fig. 5) was unexpectedly deadly. With just 16 shots fired on August 7, 1914, he
estimated he had taken down 600 to 700 German cavalrymen. Some computed
41This alludes to British Private Edgar Norman Gladden’s feeling that this was a “war of
guns and mathematics” [Gladden 1930, p. 121]. See the introduction to this volume by David
Aubin and Catherine Goldstein.
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Figure 5. The celebrated 75-mm cannon of the French field ar-
tillery, here adapted for anti-aircraft shooting. Note the high-angle
of shooting. From La Nature44–2 (1916), p. 135. Courtesy of the
MPIWG, Berlin.
that this amounted to one dead per kilo of explosive—and marveled at such a high
return!42
Among the first “lessons” drawn from the emergence of scientific warfare was
the conviction that heavy artillery now played a much bigger role than expected
(see, e.g., [Bos 1923] and [Rouquerol 1920]). Following General Hippolyte Lan-
glois’s doctrine, the French Army had hitherto emphasized the auxiliary role of
artillery with respect to infantry in open warfare. A regulation of 1913 that is often
quoted stated: “artillery does not prepare the attacks, it supports them.”43 Despite
the success of “the little Frenchman” as the light rapid-firing 75-mm cannon was
sometimes called [Sainean 1916, p. 145], in 1914 the French troops’ morale greatly
suffered from the German domination in terms of heavy artillery. Shell shock was
made worse by the evidence that the long range of German guns kept them out
42[Gascouin 1920, pp. 78–81]. On the 75-mm cannon, literature is abundant; see especially
an early praise [Houllevigue 1914], and more informed studies in [Challe´at 1933–1935, vol. 2,
pp. 338–364] and [Rouquerol 1919, pp. 58–77].
43“L’artillerie ne pre´pare pas les attaques, elle les appuie” (quoted in [Gascouin 1920, p. 56]).
For the French combat doctrine before WWI, see [Percin 1914, p. 165], and [Foch 1903, p. 314].
This doctrine was by and large based on [Langlois 1892] and [Langlois 1906]. On Langlois, see
[P.N. 1907], [Glu¨ck 1919], and [Ripperger 1995]. For contrary opinions expressed just before the
outbreak of WWI, see [Herr 1913] and [Rouquerol 1914].
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of reach of their French counterparts, which were overwhelmed, too few in num-
bers, and generally outdated. The President of the Republic, Raymond Poincare´,
lamented the lack of cannons and ammunition. Marshall Ferdinand Foch himself
underscored the inefficiency of the 75s for indirect fire. In this domain as well as in
many others, unpreparedness seemed appalling not only to military officers but also
to some astute civilian observers.44 What made this realization even more painful
was the fact that it had been discussed at length in artillery circles just before the
war.45 In haste, naval artillery and siege cannons were brought to the frontline
and positioned on terrain they had not been designed to occupy. As is well known,
new material was ordered en masse. In May, the Socialist Member of Parliament,
Albert Thomas, was put in charge of armament production at the ministerial level,
and the former Director of Artillery, General Louis Baquet, was sent back to the
front: in his eyes, a politician was “better armed than a general to sustain political
assaults.”46 In the summer of 1915, the French Army started to receive new pieces
of large caliber.
While the strategic importance of artillery, and especially heavy artillery in-
creased significantly, the tactical use of cannons underwent important changes as
well. Anti-aircraft and anti-zeppelin firing, mountain engagements, and the gen-
eral need for shooting from entrenched positions behind a protective monticule—
which was called indirect fire—required new procedures. In August 1915, General
Fre´de´ric-Georges Herr was put in charge of the defense of Verdun and suffered the
full blow of the German offensive in February 1916. In 1912, Herr had observed the
Balkan wars and predicted many of the features of the war he was now fighting [Herr
1913]. By 1915 it had become clear to him that the main problem facing artillery
was no longer a simple question of supply and materials: “a gigantic intellectual
effort was required.” In particular, shooting had become the focus of attention. “It
had become necessary to [be able to] shoot on invisible objectives, during the night,
and, in all circumstances, shots had to be of the utmost accuracy . . . so as not to
hit friendly troops” [Herr 1923, p. 39]. Now, to shoot accurately had become a
complex technoscientific problem, which involved the identification of targets using
sound-ranging or aerial reconnaissance, their localization on large-scale maps that
needed to be produced in large quantities, the development of reliable telephonic
communication between observers and gunners, better knowledge of meteorological
data at various altitudes (wind, pressure, and temperature), and precise firing ta-
bles. “Meteorology, acoustics, optics, cartography, what branch of science was not
drafted in artillery’s service?” [Be´dier 1919, p. 180]. As a testimony of the impor-
tance of artillery in the war, it is worth noting that, in all these areas, significant
technological and scientific advances were made from 1914 to 1918.47
The new guns required new firing tables. The new uses demanded that existing
tables be extended to higher shooting angles. It had made sense to compute direct
44For example [Lebon 1915, p. 220] and [Reinach 1916, pp. 253–260]. See also the testimonies
of the commanders, such as [Poincare´ 1928, vol. 5, pp. 333–334] or [Foch 1931, vol. 1, p. 19]. On
the insufficiencies of the 75, see [Percin 1914, p. 264].
45See [Ripperger 1995], as well as [Be´dier 1919, pp. 147–157].
46[Baquet 1921, p. 15]. For an overview of the evolution of the materials in the artillery
during the war, see [D’Aubigny 1921].
47On observation, see [Morgan 1959–1960]. On map-making, see [Laves 1919, Winterbotham
1919, Heffernan 1996]. On sound-ranging, see note 6 above. On meteorology, see [Launay 1919,
Launay 1922].
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fire tables for guns to be used at sea, just as there was no harm in relying on time-
consuming procedures to adjust the fire of siege cannons. This was no longer the
case. Information was needed about the whole trajectory of projectiles, and not
just their range. Hence the change in terminology, whereby what used to be called
“range tables” was now known as “firing tables.” But ballistic military structures
were totally unprepared to supply them. When war broke out in August 1914,
Gaˆvre was no exception to this general trend. All but five officers deserted the
proving ground and joined fighting units. For lack of personnel, most technical
activities were abruptly interrupted, and the five military engineers who remained
desperately idled at Gaˆvre while their repeated requests to be reassigned to the
front were denied one after the other.48
To make matters worse, while the Navy had paid small attention to ballistics,
the Army had paid almost no attention to it. Before 1914, low regard, and indeed
disdain, for ballistics was entrenched among artillerymen.49 Despite a rich tradition
of ballistic studies, in the first decades of the century the Officers’ Training School
for Artillery and Engineering in Fontainebleau (the E´cole d’application d’artillerie
et du ge´nie formerly located in Metz, mentioned earlier) allowed time for barely four
lessons in the officers’ training curriculum devoted to ballistics and the principles
of firing tables.50 A conscript once complained that during instruction, “ballistics
[was] nothing other than a soporific lesson in terminology” [Malloue´ 1911, p. 136].
As a result, the philosopher Alain [E´mile Chartier] who served in the artillery during
WWI was hardly impressed by the mathematical skills of the polytechnicians he
met on the front: “Our artillerymen seemed poor mathematicians to me.”51 More
shockingly perhaps, among the staggering number of casualties there were not only
young mathematicians who might later have turned out to be precious resources for
ballistic work, but also fully-trained ballisticians whose expertise was acutely missed
at Gaˆvre. Born in 1871, Commandant Henri Batailler had been in charge of the
ballistics course at the Fontainebleau school, and he had already published several
articles on the topic in the Revue d’artillerie. But on June 9, 1915, Commandant
Batailler was killed on the Marne front.52
“Up until 1916, the artilleryman and the ballistician lived on knowledge ac-
quired in peace time” [Boissonnet 1920, p. 41]. In fact, artillerymen in fighting
units more often than not were forced to resort to their own means for improving
the accuracy of their fire. On September 9, 1914, Jules-E´mile Henches wrote from
the Marne front that “each day” he became more and more convinced that in the
fighting “science is necessary, but its application must be [made] the simplest pos-
sible” [Henches 1918, p. 8].53 “War,” wrote the physicist and astronomer Charles
Nordmann, who actively served both in the artillery and on the Commission of In-
ventions, “had ceased to be an art to become an experimental science like physics”
48[Patard 1930, p. 270n] and [Cre´mieux 1930, p. 158].
49See, e.g., [Baquet 1921, p. 28n] and [Anonymous 1921].
50[Challe´at 1933–1935], vol. 2, p. 64, n. 1; see also p. 259; Challe´at’s course at Fontainebleau
most probably condensed the lessons of his predecessor chef d’escadron Pierre-E´mile Henry, who
was among those who introduced Siacci’s methods in France [Henry 1894]. On ballistics at Metz
and Fontainebleau, see [Bru 1996].
51“Nos artilleurs m’ont paru assez peu ge´ome`tres” [Alain 1937, p. 115].
52[Sebert 1915]; see also [Garnier 1920, p. 8].
53Also interesting in regard to the scientific work of artillerymen on the front are the following
testimonies [Pastre 1918, Lintier 1916, Cardot 1987].
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[Nordmann 1917, p. 9].54 The front itself was likened to a gigantic experiment in
ballistics that should be exploited to increase shooting accuracy: “Because of the
rich harvest in experimental shooting that everyone is able daily to reap on the
front, firing tables produced before the war were found to hold insufficient, and
even erroneous, information” [Herr 1923, p. 40].
In fact, badly equipped experimental polygons sometimes lagged behind the
front, notably in the study of atmospheric densities [Boissonnet 1920]. Using accu-
rate ballistic coefficients (provided by ballisticians) and atmospheric studies made
by the meteorologists enrolled by the Army, fighting artillerymen were able to find
inaccuracies in the Gaˆvre air resistance function, which had hitherto remained
within the margin of error. Frontline expertise was developed, with which ballisti-
cians from the rearlines were hard pressed to compete. Reports had been written
by officers on the front questioning either the accuracy of the air resistance function
F (v) or the firing tables themselves. Some officers were worried “not only about
the firing tables at their disposal, but also about those that can still be delivered to
them, if they are computed on the basis of the present inaccuracies.”55 A specialist
in anti-aircraft shooting since September 1914, Henches wrote from his command
post he called “Aviatik-City” on June 18, 1915:
There have been, concerning those airplane shootings, papers over-
filled with mathematics done by people who could never see that
the instinct of a “hunting animal” is necessary here. They reach,
for that matter, by very complicated, inapplicable processes, re-
sults that are close to, but not as valuable as, those I have been
using for the last six months [Henches 1918, p. 59 & p. 85].56
On the front, artillery material was put to much more extensive testing than it ever
was on proving grounds, and, in the process, firing tables computed in the rearlines
appeared defective. In a letter from General Curie`res de Castelnau written weeks
before he was replaced by Philippe Pe´tain as the head of 2nd Army, it was stated
that regulatory tables for the 75-mm cannon differed from nomograms (or abacs)
given to motorized artillery sections. “These discordances not only concern trajec-
tories corresponding to high angles but even trajectories that are regularly used”
on the field [SHD–Terre, 2W309; Ge´ne´ral commandant la IIe arme´e a` M.le colonel
Leleu, chef de la section technique de l’artillerie, place Saint-Thomas d’Aquin, May
19, 1915]. As a result, commanding officers had their own tables of corrections, or
networks of trajectories computed [Boissonnet 1920, p. 39]. Others designed spe-
cial slide rulers or mechanical aiming devices [Garnier 1922, p. 111]. Some artillery
units lost confidence in the tables computed by theoretical means and corrected
them on their own by experimental means. “Thus instead of having a single range
table carefully established in the rearlines, there were many built with the help of
a very large number of shots carried out in lousy experimental conditions.”57
54On Nordmann, see David Aubin’s contribution in [Goldstein & Aubin forthcoming].
55“Quelques officiers . . . manifestent quelque inquie´tude, non seulement sur les tables de
tir dont ils disposent, mais sur celles qu’on peut encore leur de´livrer, si elles sont calcule´s par les
errements actuels” [Garnier 1918a, p. 1]. This book which gathers various secret notes written
during the war by Garnier can be found in various slightly different versions. I quote from one of
the differing copies kept at the Bibliothe`que nationale de France, in Paris, call number 8-V-42188.
56On the lack of practical knowledge of heavy artillery officers, see also ibid., pp. 149–150.
57“On l’a bien vu au cours de la guerre : il est arrive´ souvent, en effet, qu’une batterie,
avertie par des insucce`s de l’inexactitude de sa table de tir e´tablie par des proce´de´s the´oriques,
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The electrical engineer Hippolyte Parodi, who would come to play an important
part in computing new ballistic tables for the French Army using graphical methods,
underscored that he had first become aware of the initial insufficiency of firing tables
while he was fighting on the front:
When I was called to head the Service de balistique et de pre´-
paration des tables de tir, I had long been aware, according to
the shots I had taken or controlled on the front, that the near
totality of firing tables in use in the Army were clearly false and
that they had been established . . . through “archaic,” inexact
and simplified methods.58
The tables, Parodi went on, were not only wrong; they were also inconsistent and
self-contradictory. Some projectile might, for example, have, for the same line of
departure, a greater range for a smaller initial velocity.
These errors and these incoherencies, which thankfully were un-
covered only by a handful of artillery officers, were susceptible of
arousing doubts in the mind of the combattants and to withdraw
all confidence in the technical documents that were distributed
to them... Yet, who knows whether by making some battery
commanders excessively prudent this distrust would not have
allowed, at the beginning of the war, for the saving of precious
human lives?”59
Parodi’s hopes notwithstanding, officers did notice deficiencies in firing tables.
“Artillerymen demanded experimental firing tables, established by cannon fire [a`
coups de canon],” not by theory which they distrusted [Boissonnet 1920, p. 40]. In
the face of such criticism, professional ballisticians repeated that “exterior ballistics
was, before the war, brought by the Gaˆvre Commission to a degree of perfection
which fully satisfied all practical requirements” [Garnier 1918b, p. i].60 This meant
that there existed accurate firing tables corresponding to initial speed up to 850 m/s
and initial angle up to 20◦. But fighting officers sometimes not only questioned the
accuracy of the firing tables they had at their disposal but also the very possibility
of computing them with enough precision [Garnier 1918a]. At the Section technique
de l’artillerie, Parodi concluded that many cannon shots were necessary to establish
a firing table: “One should not forget that firing tables are only worth what the
l’a rectifie´e expe´rimentalement sur le front. Ainsi, au lieu d’une seule table de tir bien e´tablie a`
l’arrie`re, il y en avait plusieurs construites a l’aide de tre`s nombreux tirs, faits dans de mauvaises
conditions expe´rimentales et pre´sentant souvent de gros inconve´nients militaires.” [Academy of
Sciences, Lebesgue to Hadamard, October 23, 1919; Commission de la de´fense nationale, dossier
“Balistique”].
58“Quand j’ai e´te´ appele´ a` la direction du Service de balistique et de pre´paration des tables
de tir, il y avait longtemps que je savais, d’apre`s les tirs que j’avais dirige´s ou controˆle´s au front,
que la presque totalite´ des tables de tir en usage aux Arme´es e´taient nettement fausses et qu’elles
avaient e´te´ e´tablies . . . par des me´thodes ‘archa¨ıques,’ inexactes ou simplifie´es” [Academy of
Sciences, Parodi to Hadamard, October 30, 1919; Commission de la de´fense nationale, dossier
“Balistique;” emphasized by Parodi]. On Parodi, see [Darrieus 1968] and [Merger 1994].
59“Ces erreurs et ces incohe´rences qui, heureusement n’ont e´te´ de´cele´es que par un tre`s petit
nombre d’officiers d’artillerie, e´taient de nature a` porter le doute dans l’esprit du combattant et
a` lui enlever toute confiance dans les documents techniques qui lui ont e´te´ remis... Qui sait pour-
tant si cette de´fiance, en rendant syste´matiquement prudents certains commandants de batteries,
n’aurait pas permis, au de´but de la guerre, d’e´conomiser de pre´cieuses vies humaines ?” Ibid.
60See also [Peira 1955–1957, vol. 1, p. 36].
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experiments used as a basis for computations are worth, and that the mathematical
apparatus [appareil mathe´matique] in which they have been enclosed is incapable
in itself of increasing their precision. Many cannon shots must be fired [Il faut
consentir a` tirer beaucoup de coups de canon]”[Academy of Sciences, Parodi to
Hadamard, October 30, 1919]. Even the mathematician, Henri Lebesgue (1875–
1941), who had collaborated with Parodi in the Mathematics Section placed under
the under-secretary of inventions concurred: “What is this computing sickness,
when experiments are (apparently), and in all cases can be, carried out. There are
certainly places in France where real shooting by 75s is done . . . and there is the
front.”61
The ballisticians at Gaˆvre therefore felt the need to emphasize that the “mathe-
matical toolbox [outillage mathe´matique]” they used was no “smokescreen [trompe-
l’œil ]” [Garnier 1918a, p. 8]. On the contrary, ballisticians emphasized, mathe-
matics was indispensable for correctly evaluating perturbations depending on the
particular circumstances of shooting. As the war unfolded, hopes indeed increased
as to the possibility of firing without preparation. Was it possible to open fire on
a target, having allowed for all modifications due to the special circumstances by
means of computations, without any prior warning? This question had a solution,
and all belligerents were looking for it from the moment the war had started.
4. Scientific Work at Gaˆvre
How the requirements of fighting artillerymen impacted the Gaˆvre Commission,
and the specific role played by mathematicians over there remains to be examined.
As was hinted at above, Gaˆvre was not the only institution involved in the French
ballistic effort of 1915–1918. Under Parodi’s energetic leadership, the Calais Com-
mission played a major part in the computing effort together with the Board of
Inventions (the Direction des inventions inte´ressant la de´fense nationale, in which
the Paris mathematicians Lebesgue and Montel were also involved). To fulfill his
tasks, Parodi suggested that high school teachers and university professors be mo-
bilized for the task. More than 400 answered positively and about 300 effectively
worked on the project. The team computed trajectories for every initial angle α
multiple of 5◦ from 0◦ to 90◦; for initial velocities varying from 0 to 1000 m/s and for
various values of ballistic coefficients.62 Intense computational work was moreover
carried out by the so-called “Commission ALVF” [artillerie lourde sur voie ferre´e,
that is, heavy artillery on rail], the committee in charge of organizing railway ar-
tillery headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Girardville, which produced extensive tables
giving range as a function of initial angle, initial velocity, and ballistic coefficient.
61[Lebesgue 1991], letter CCXIII, p. 319; this letter is tentatively dated early 1915 by Pierre
Dugac. On the Lebesgue–Borel correspondence during WWI, see He´le`ne Gispert’s contribution
to [Goldstein & Aubin forthcoming].
62Details above come from [Ottenheimer 1924, pp. 51–52]. One should however take these
numbers with care. According to a secret report from December 1916, the computing board put
together by Lebesgue and Montel had only recruited between 30 and 40 voluntary collaborators
including actuaries and astronomers [Fonds Painleve´, 313/AP/62]. Numbers cited by Ottenheimer
are considerable considering the available pool of mathematics professors and teachers at the time.
Before the war, there were only 65 university professors in mathematics in the whole of France.
To approximate the number of high school teachers, one may consider that the professional union
[Association des professeurs de l’enseignement secondaire public] counted 501 members in 1913,
of which 102 were in Paris [Barbazo & Pombourcq 2010].
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Contrary to all previous practices, these tables, called the “(α, V0, c) tables” (here
with a capital “V”) were abstract constructs corresponding to no specific cannon
or projectile.63 At Gaˆvre, the naval engineer, Georges Sugot, also introduced a new
method for speeding up computations, called the fictitious speed method [me´thode
des vitesses fictives] [Sugot 1918].
As was pointed out, all this work, whose immediate usefulness was questioned,
was only as good as the physical assumptions on which it was based. Knowledge of
air resistance laws and the atmospheric density variation with respect to altitude
might be improved with unknown effects on the computed tables. From both a
mathematical and a practical point of view, it was the step-by-step method de-
veloped collaboratively by the mathematician Haag and the military ballistician
Maurice Garnier that was the most innovative as well as the most lasting effort in
ballistics during WWI.
On June 16, 1917, Haag was assigned to the testing center of Vitry-le-Franc¸ois
where he instructed training officers. On November 29, he was promoted to the
rank of Lieutenant. In his commendation, Charbonnier wrote:
Ever since he arrived at Gaˆvre, M. Haag has studied the im-
provement and practical application of the new ballistic meth-
ods required by present shooting conditions, and especially by the
problems of aerial shooting. . . . Monsieur Haag significantly con-
tributed to this work and, among the important questions to whose
solution he contributed I must name the following:
(1) the improvement of step-by-step computing processes;
(2) the invention and development of a computation method for
differential coefficients;
(3) new and original applications of probability theory to the
determination of the detonation ellipses of projectiles with
fuses.64
Charbonnier’s commendation clearly distinguished between principal and sec-
ondary problems in ballistics, as well as problems linked with probability theory.
After the war, Haag summarized some of his work on probability theory in the
fourth volume of Borel’s Treatise on Probability [Haag 1926]. As we shall see be-
low, Haag’s contribution to secondary ballistics problems played a crucial part in
increasing the accuracy of scientific shooting procedures. But from a mathematical
point of view, it was his contribution to the principal problem of ballistics—to solve
63Established in 1916 by the War Ministry, the Commission ALVF had computed several
general tables for angles of 22◦, 28◦, 33◦ and 44◦, with initial velocities between 300 to 900 m/s
and various ballistic coefficients. In 1919, the tables used the Gaˆvre air resistance law and a better
estimate of the variation of atmospheric density with altitude [ALVF 1921].
64Jules Haag’s military file [SHD–Terre, 6–Ye–17966]: “Depuis son arrive´e a` Gaˆvre, M. Haag
a e´te´ employe´ a` l’e´tude du perfectionnement et a` la mise en application pratique des me´thodes
balistiques nouvelles qu’exigeaient les conditions de tir actuelles et en particulier les proble`mes de
tirs ae´riens, qui ont pris une importance si grande, aussi bien pour le De´partement de la Guerre
que celui de la Marine.
Monsieur Haag a contribue´ dans une large mesure a` ces travaux et, parmi les questions
importantes a` la solution desquelles il a collabore´, je dois citer les suivantes :
a) Ame´lioration des proce´de´s de calculs des trajectoires par arcs successifs.
b) E´laboration et mise au point d’une me´thode de calcul des coefficients diffe´rentiels.
c) Applications nouvelles et originales du calcul des probabilite´s a` la de´termination des el-
lipses d’e´clatement des projectiles fusants.”
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Figure 6. Preparing for aerial shooting at the training center
for practical anti-aircraft shooting in Arnouville, 1917. From left
to right in the foreground, Jules Haag (taking a photo), Garnier,
Page´zy (the head of the training center), Rouch (head of the Army
Meteorological Service) and an unidentified officer from the train-
ing center. From [Patard 1930, p. 288].
the hodograph—that is the most significant. In the following, we shall examine the
mathematicians’ work at Gaˆvre from two perspectives: (1) we will look in more
detail at the specific ways in which Haag was able to work on and improve the
step-by-step method that, as we have seen, can be dated back to Euler; and (2) we
will review collaborative experimental and computing procedures followed at Gaˆvre
and the role played by mathematicians in them.
4.1. The Theory of Errors. Already in the note he sent to the CRAS in
1915, Haag made an interesting innovation in exterior ballistics. Since, in practice,
initial conditions were never known exactly, every gunner was perfectly aware of the
need for determining the effects of small variations in the main three parameters:
initial velocity, line of departure, and ballistic coefficient. This was usually done by
simple interpolation in the tables. Alternatively, Siacci had analyzed, in the case
of direct fire, the effect of substituting v0+∆v0, α+ δα, and c+∆c in the equation
of the trajectory (equation 2.2). No method existed, however, for providing such
estimates in the Eulerian step-by-step method to which one was forced to resort in
the case of general trajectories, in particular those involved in airplane bombings
with which Haag was at first concerned [Haag 1915a]. With his formal training in
mathematical analysis, Haag was easily able to evaluate the size of the error without
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having to integrate the equation.65 In a formal analogy with celestial mechanics, he
simply tracked down, at any given order of approximation, the errors thus produced.
This is the work that had caught Charbonnier’s eye.
When he reached Gaˆvre at the end of 1915, Haag undertook the systematic
study of errors in ballistic theory. The first to work on this problem, he published
his results after the war [Haag 1921]. In this account, Eulerian integration methods
produced two kinds of error. The ballistic error came from the assumption that
air resistance was quadratic over the small integration step. The geometric error
was due to approximations in the method of integration. Assuming that the arc
was infinitely small, Haag therefore produced a complete analysis of both types
of error. Hopefully, this method would provide an estimate of the maximal arc
lengths that gave the precision needed with minimal computation time, allowing
the considerable acceleration of the laborious process of computation. At Gaˆvre,
piecewise integration procedures used the angle τ of the projectile velocity with
respect to the horizontal as the independent variable, whereas American and British
ballisticians instead chose time. Following an ad hoc rule, arcs were selected so that
the angle decreased by less than 5◦ and the velocity loss did not exceed 50 m/s over
the length of the arc. Using his method, Haag could show that this rule was no
guarantee against imprecision or inefficiency: “parts of the trajectory are computed
with a precision that is much too high, while others are insufficiently precise” [Haag
1921, p. 21]. A new, more complicated rule was derived for determining the arcs
for which the relative error remained smaller than 1/500.
Together with the naval engineer, Maurice Garnier, Haag applied this rule and
designed a new computing procedure. Computing skeletons can be found in Haag’s
article [Haag 1921, pp. 18–19, 27 & 30]. Convergence radii of the expansion series
were studied carefully to achieve the given precision. This at last provided a basis
for making the “rational choice of the amplitude” of integration steps [Garnier 1922,
p. 126]. This computing method was called the GH method (for Garnier–Haag)
and was presented in a special report in January 1917.
But this scientific method was not as efficient as one might have wanted. Later
that year, the mathematics teacher [agre´ge´ de mathe´matiques] Ose´e Marcus (fig-
ure 7), who was employed as a computer, pointed out that computing procedures
could be quickened by dispensing with the consideration of radii of convergence and
by relying instead on simple Taylor approximations.66 Incorporating other minor
65Note that Haag’s work in ballistics is not directly related to his previous research in dif-
ferential geometry. Supervised by Gaston Darboux, his doctoral thesis dealt with Lame´ surfaces
[Haag 1910].
66A Jewish immigrant from the Baltics, Marcus appears not to have been drafted in a fighting
unit. For the rest of his life, he remained on the French Navy’s payroll, carrying out computations
for them in his home in Neuilly-sur-Seine. I wish to thank Marcus’ niece, Simone Marcus, for
these informations.
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Figure 7. Ose´e Marcus in the 1920s. Courtesy of Simone Marcus.
points made by Captain Le´vy (from the Mining Corps)67 and from Georges Val-
iron,68 the GHM (Garnier–Haag–Marcus) method was adopted in September 1917
and remained in use until after World War II in France.69
Discussions about the approximation introduced by Marcus highlight a diver-
gence of viewpoints between theory and practice:
In the case of practical computations involving numerical inte-
gration, it is more often harmful than useful, more complicated
than it is advantageous, to perform the rigorous quadratures pro-
vided by analysis. Thus are we sometimes led to reject certain
analytical formulae—no matter how elegant and seductive they
may seem to a mathematician’s eyes—to perform quadratures by
simple approximation methods, apparently coarser, but in truth
quicker and more precise [Garnier 1918b, p. vi].
As one can see, theses debates lay at the root of the later development of applied
mathematics and numerical analysis.
4.2. Practical Work and Collaborative Procedures. At Gaˆvre, Haag’s
work took place in a special unit devoted to anti-aircraft gunnery. As discussed
above, anti-aircraft gunnery posed a difficult challenge to older ballistic methods.
67This is probably an allusion to the probabilist, Paul Le´vy, who was in the Mining Corps
and an anti-aircraft officer during WWI. Although he served as an instructor at Arnouville-le`s-
Gonesses (figure 6) in 1916, Le´vy was mobilized in a fighting unit for most of the war and did
not mention his work at Gaˆvre in his autobiography [Le´vy 1970, pp. 54–55]. He is, however,
mentioned in [Charbonnier 1928b, p. 580].
68Later a Professor of Analysis at the Sorbonne, Valiron was then a mathematics teacher at
the lyce´e of Lyons (in the classes pre´paratoires). On the French system of higher education, see
the contribution by Jean-Luc Chabert and Christian Gilain to this volume.
69In the GH method, the final velocity of the arc was first computed by approximating the
arc as a parabola. The variations of the elements of motion Ds and Dσ were first computed
by exact quadratures. Dx and Dy were approximately computed with Ds and Dt with Dσ. In
the GHM method, variations were computed directly using Taylor series and averages [Garnier
1918b].
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Figure 8. From left to right, Maurice Garnier, Louis Fort, and
Gustave Lyon with measuring instruments, undated. From [Patard
1930, p. 275].
It was the engineer, Gustave Lyon (figure 8, on the right), who pushed for its cre-
ation. A polytechnician (X 1877) working as an acoustical engineer, Lyon had vol-
unteered in 1914 and was soon in charge of the protection of the port of Cherbourg
against airborne assaults. The Mission du tir ae´rien de Gaˆvre (MTAG) was set up
under Lyon and Garnier’s authority in April 1916. Soon, this “scientifico-technical
organization” [Charbonnier 1928b, p. 580] counted a dozen mathematicians and
physicists working under military guidance (table 1). Charbonnier described the
procedure followed by the MTAG in a memo written in December 1917. This led
to its formal establishment by the Navy Ministry, on January 30, 1918, under the
name of Mission balistique du tir ae´rien (MBTA), with a section based in Paris for
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Name Rank and title Functions
Chaˆtelet 2nd-class officer in health First assigned to the MTAG
services; Assistant Professor until Sept. 1917, then assistant
at University of Lille; to Naval Engineer Anne:
Doctor of Sciences helps with the preparation and
execution of shootings;
drafts reports and computations
Denjoy Soldier in infantry; General service
Doctor of Sciences; Professor
at University of Montpellier
Ferdinand Soldier in infantry; Assistant to Naval Artillery
Dreyfus Bachelor in Science Engineer Sugot: same
actuary at Ministry of Work functions as Chaˆtelet
Fort Warrant officer in the infantry; Preparation, execution, and
mathematics teacher at naval interpretation of aerial shootings
school and lyce´e of Neuilly
Goullins Lieutenant in reserve Helps with, then directs, shots;
metropolitan artillery; main drafter of reports (flares
Naval Artillery Engineer and incendiary shells) after
he becomes member of the
Commission in Sept. 1917.
Assist. to Sugot on gunpowders
Haag Second lieutenant in artillery; Improvement and application
Professor at University of of new methods for
Clermont-Ferrand computing trajectories
Kampe´ de Auxiliary in infantry; Doctor of Assistant to Sugot: helps with
Fe´riet Sciences; Assistant Astronomer shooting; drafts reports and
at Paris Observatory computations
Marcus Ordnance soldier; Assistant to Garnier for
mathematics teacher experiments and computing
Pe´lissier Auxiliary in infantry, then Assistant to Anne; same
second lieutenant in artillery functions as Chaˆtelet
student at E´cole normale
supe´rieure
Sauvigny Temporary Second Lieutenant Assistant to Anne; same
in artillery; mathematics functions as Chaˆtelet
teacher at lyce´e of Nancy
Valiron Soldier in the infantry; special Assistant to Garnier for
mathematics teacher at lyce´e experiments and computing
of Lyons
Table 1. Mobilized Scientific Personal at the Gaˆvre Commis-
sion during WWI. From [Patard 1930, pp. 277–278]. In addition,
Ernest Esclangon, from the Bordeaux Observatory, and Gabriel
Foe¨x, from Zu¨rich, were present as non-mobilized scientific per-
sonal.
theoretical investigations and another in Lorient in charge of experimental stud-
ies.70 It is interesting to examine the procedure outlined by Charbonnier to get a
precise understanding of the type of work mathematicians were doing at Gaˆvre.
First, for all types of guns and projectiles, the ballistic coefficient was evalu-
ated with one or two shots. A network of 19 trajectories was completely computed
70Charbonnier, Rapport No. 7, Note adresse´e a` l’Inge´nieur ge´ne´ral, directeur central de
l’Artillerie navale, December 17, 1917 [SHD–Terre, 10W73].
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using the labor-intensive step-by-step method, and computed twice to insure that
no mistake was made. The second step of the procedure was new with respect to
previous customs. Extensive series of experiments were performed to measure the
trajectory and duration of flight using a simplified theodolite designed by Lyon and
a chronophotographic instrument. This led to an immense amount of work. For 60
to 80 shots, 1,000 to 1,200 observations were taken that had to be analyzed. Atmo-
spheric conditions were measured using weather balloons. Using all this material,
the third step in the procedure consisted of preparing a corrected table using the
computing method developed by Haag and Garnier. For each series of 9 shots, the
piecewise integration had to be performed on about ten arcs. Finally, the MTAG
produced networks of curves with shell trajectories and isochrone lines. “Refraining
from imposing a method or an apparatus, the MTAG strictly limited itself to its
ballistic role: to give combattants (Army and Navy) the networks they wanted.”71
This led them however to produce extensive networks: for the 75-mm cannon, for
example, it contained more than 40 sheets for each type of projectile.
Notes written for a series of experiments undertaken in the spring of 1916 can
help to convey an even clearer sense of the mathematicians’ activities at Gaˆvre. In
one set, Garnier wrote down very specific instructions: “In view of coordinating
efforts in the best possible way and to achieve [our objectives] as fast as possible
. . . I indicate in the following the detailed division of labor.”72 The workload was
divided into field and office work. In the field, Garnier, another officer, and a soldier
operated the battery; mathematicians (Haag and Chaˆtelet), officers, workers, and
apprentices manned three observation stations, while others tended the register-
ing instrument (figure 8). In order to communicate between observation stations,
mathematicians were asked to study Morse code [SHD–Terre, 10W73; Comptes
rendus de la Commission de Gaˆvre. Note no. 6, May 29, 1916 & note no. 9, June
2, 1916].
The office work was also strictly divided among participants. Haag, for ex-
ample, assisted by an apprentice named Guillaouic, was supposed to compute the
fundamental trajectories and the differential coefficients that allowed for correct tra-
jectories for given experimental conditions and, on this basis, draw the networks.
Together with a military officer, Louis Fort, a mathematics teacher at the lyce´e
of Neuilly, was assigned the task of preparing the shots and analyzing shooting
conditions. On the chronophotographic plates, Fort was in charge of measuring the
Cartesian coordinates of every explosion of the fuses that were recorded. Assisted
by an apprentice, Albert Chaˆtelet, a maˆıtre de confe´rences at the University of
Lille, was supposed to perform all the operations needed to draw isochrone lines on
the networks.73
On June 12, 1916, experiments had been performed and computational assign-
ments were ready to be carried out. In a very explicit report, Garnier listed all
71Charbonnier, Rapport No. 7, p. 6 [SHD–Terre, 10W73].
72“En vue de coordonner le mieux possible les efforts, pour aboutir dans les de´lais les plus
rapides, . . . j’indique ci-apre`s la re´partition de´taille´e du travail.” Comptes rendus de la Com-
mission de Gaˆvre. Note no. 6, May 29, 1916 [SHD–Terre, 10W73]. This series of 13 numbered
notes from May and June 1916 follow from the establishement of the MTAG in April 1916. All
are signed by Garnier and can be found in [SHD–Terre, 10W73].
73In fact, Chaˆtelet had been called to Lille on August 5, 1914 and only took up his position
there in 1919. See [Condette 2009] and Se´bastien Gauthier’s contribution to [Goldstein & Aubin
forthcoming].
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the operations that everyone had to do in sequence [SHD–Terre, 10W73; Comptes
rendus de la Commission de Gaˆvre, Note no. 12, June 12, 1916]. But two weeks
later, orders were modified due to changes in personnel and in priorities. All per-
sonnel not otherwise busy were to contribute to the computation of the networks
under Haag’s supervision. A 16-step procedure explained the work in an even more
detailed manner. All apprentices received precise assignments; sample tables were
drawn for computers to fill in; the number of copies to be made and the destination
of each copy was specified; every computation and drawing to be done was described
in detail [SHD–Terre, 10W73; Comptes rendus de la Commission de Gaˆvre, Note
no. 16, June 26, 1916].
While military work at Gaˆvre may have seemed enviable compared to the lot
of soldiers on the front, it was not without danger. In a talk delivered in Lille in
1924, Chaˆtelet recalled an accident that occurred to him. In one of the shootings,
observers behind the cannon was huge red flares and abundant black smoke coming
out of the mouthpiece that was expelling shades of shell for about one minute. The
shell had exploded in the barrel and the cannoneers had nowhere to hide: “I can
insure you, even if this is not in the written report, that observers . . . felt that one
minute can be very long.”74
From the minute description of the work done at Gaˆvre, one gets a rich im-
pression of what it meant to use the mathematicians’ skills in the First World
War. That impression is far from the Romantic vision of genius solving a problem
that had frustrated ignorant militarymen for ages. On the contrary, ballisticians at
Gaˆvre had enough mathematical sophistication to be able to see the added value
mathematicians were susceptible of bringing to their trade. It also seems clear that
mathematicians were not “well prepared for their new role” [Patard 1930, p. 279]
and that, at first, their experience at Gaˆvre may have been rather humbling. But
in time, all could see how tight collaboration and division of labor was necessary for
producing important results such as firing tables. Only then, could collaborative
procedures drafted by ballisticians make room for mathematicians’ special abilities
and sometimes assign them to positions of leadership.
4.3. Application to the Battlefield. Firing tables were not the end of the
story. Artillerymen needed to be trained in order to make good use of them. In
this, mathematicians had, once again, a crucial part to play. Officers testified that a
“carnet de Haag” [Boissonnet 1920, p. 39] circulated underground, one year before
it was printed and distributed officially (see figure 9). In this course designed for
trainee officers, Haag wrote that the exact solution of the ballistic problem was a
“chimera.” But, he added, “one can, as in all experimental problems, look for an
approximate solution. I will try to show you what this solution is and what degree
of confidence we may grant to it.”75
In this course, Haag argued for the usefulness of the mathematical approach to
firing, which was presented as a mathematical problem. “Given a target, a cannon,
74“je puis vous assurer, quoique ce ne soit pas sans le proce`s verbal, que les observateurs
. . . trouve`rent qu’une minute, c¸a peut eˆtre tre`s long.” The typed text of Chaˆtelet’s speech with
handwritten annotations can be found among his papers [Fonds Chaˆtelet, 81 J 117]. I wish to
thank Se´bastien Gauthier for making this document available to me.
75“Le proble`me est ardu. La solution exacte est une chime`re. Mais on peut, comme pour
tous les proble`mes d’ordre expe´rimental, en chercher une solution approche´e. Je vais essayer
de vous montrer en quoi consiste cette solution et quel est le degre´ de confiance qu’on peut lui
accorder” [Haag 1917, p. 3].
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Figure 9. Le carnet de Haag : Haag’s Course to Artillery Officers
in Training [Haag 1917]. Coll. Ministe`re de la de´fense, service
historique.
[and] ammunition, it is asked to send one or several shells to the target, or at least
to its immediate neighborhood.”76 The problem had two solutions: the first was
to fire several shots and observe the effect; the second was to prepare the shooting
in such a way that the first shot fell, if not on the target, then at least in its
vicinity. If the first method was simpler and applicable without special training, if
it did the trick for the daily operations of 75-mm cannons, it was too expensive,
too time-consuming as far as heavy artillery was concerned.
The various mathematical operations required in the artillery and the different
procedures developed on the field were evaluated in terms of efficiency: computing
76“E´tant donne´ un objectif, un canon, des munitions, il s’agit d’envoyer un ou plusieurs
obus sur l’objectif, ou au moins dans un voisinage imme´diat”[Haag 1917, p. 3].
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Figure 10. Nomogram used to adjust artillery fire developed by
Haag during WWI. Repr. from [Haag 1917]. Service historique de
la De´fense.
in the command post, the use of double-entry tables for deviations, the manip-
ulation of slide rulers, the considerations of graphs, and mechanical instruments.
Figure 10 shows a nomogram prepared by the Army in order to adjust the fire given
two observers at different spots. 750 copies of this nomogram were produced by
November 1917. But were they used? Haag’s course clearly shows that the hierar-
chy seemed intent on increasing the mathematical level of artillerymen serving on
the front.
Testimonies from men in the field show that this intention was not illusory.
Take the case of the young Jean-Alexandre Cardot. He was merely 16 when war
broke out and pursued his mathematical education in the troubled circumstances
of war. In 1917, he may have been among Haag’s audience at the artillery school
at Fontainebleau. He gave a vivid account of his first campaign in a battery of 75s
in Lorraine in 1918. In Cardot’s description, firing had indeed become a scientific
exercise. Every target was located on maps by their coordinates. Weather reports
transmitted daily the force and direction of the wind. Communications between
observers and cannoneers were insured via the telephone. One day, he went out with
his Lieutenant to test new shells that could reach a target at 11 kilometers. Cardot
described firing manouvers in detail. He explained how he was asked to use simple
mathematical instruments and computations. The lieutenant told him: “You will
direct the fire. . . . Go. Here’s the firing table” [Cardot 1987, p. 65]. Although the
lieutenant tried to trick him by handing him the wrong table, Cardot was wiser
and the German train in the distance was finally shot down.
At the level of the General Staff, scientific firing was now taken for granted.
At the end of 1917, according to General Herr, “the time ha[d] come when the
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French artillery at long last found, if not a complete and definitive [answer], at
least one that was precise enough to be applicable henceforth.” The solution to
the problem of firing by surprise was “the scientific preparation of shooting [la
pre´paration scientifique du tir ]” [Herr 1923, p. 93]. In October 1917, the French
artillery was able to fire at night or in the fog: “a fearful innovation” [Herr 1923,
p 94]. It now possessed:
a scientific shooting method [that allowed] for shooting under
any weather condition, at any time, on every terrain, in all cir-
cumstances. . . . It [was] able to open fire almost instantaneously
on any seen or unseen point merely identified by its coordinates
on a map [Herr 1923, p 95].
By the end of the war, the French artillery was finally using “scientific ballistics”
[Challe´at 1933–1935, vol. 2, p. 314]. Those were “the French methods of firing” that
American artillerymen were taught in 1917 [Grotelueschen 2001, p. 20]. Although
less praised than tanks and less bedeviled than poison gas, the new firing methods
played no small part in the outcome of the war, and the cannon was called the
“artisan of Victory” [Rouquerol 1920]. “It was the massive surprise action of our
artillery which, from July 18, 1918 onwards, insured the success of our great offen-
sives until Germany’s capitulation” [Campana 1923, p. 122]. Ballisticians, it would
seem, had successfuly fulfilled their mission. As we have argued, this success owed
much to their ability to enroll the effective collaboration of some mathematicians.
5. Mathematicians’ Attitudes towards Ballistics
After the war, ballisticians wished to assert the new scientific status of their trade.
Charbonnier praised the progress on ballistics achieved by the “alliance, made by
the war, of ballisticians and savants” (Charbonnier’s preface in [Garnier 1918b,
p. viii]). While it used to be the exclusive domain of engineers and technicians,
ballistics had, he wanted to say, truly become a first-rank science. “Because of its
intrinsic interest, as pure science as well as for national interest, ballistics deserves
to become, as it once was, a topic of research for pure scientists.”77 Mathemati-
cians, however, appeared rather more circumspect about the mathematical value of
wartime ballistic research. Asked by Jacques Hadamard to report on the ballistic
computations in which he had taken part, Lebesgue wrote on October 23, 1919:
such a report would perhaps be more pertinent if it were addressed
to a Committee awarding the prix de vertu [attributed at that time
for the most courageous act on the part of a poor Frenchman], since
none of those who worked on the construction of systems of ballis-
tic trajectories claims to have done scientific work by performing
numerical computations using well-known procedures; all merely
tried to be useful.78
77See Charbonnier’s preface in [Garnier 1918b, p. viii]. Charbonnier reached out again to
mathematicians at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Toronto in 1924 [Charbonnier
1928b].
78“Un tel rapport serait peut-eˆtre plus le´gitime s’il e´tait adresse´ a` la Commission des prix
de vertu, car aucun de ceux qui ont travaille´ a` la construction du re´seau ne pre´tend avoir fait
œuvre scientifique en effectuant des calculs nume´riques par des proce´de´s bien connus ; tous se
sont efforce´s simplement d’eˆtre utiles” [Academy of Sciences, Lebesgue to Hadamard, October
23, 1919].
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Lebesgue went on to explain that the team he headed (together with Montel) com-
puted more than a thousand trajectories, each of them independently computed
by two persons. This work, Lebesgue concluded, was useful because it allowed the
quick construction of range tables at a time when few shooting tests could be car-
ried out due to the overload of work encountered by proving grounds and military
research institutions. “But the extent of the effort should not lead one to think
that the tool that was constructed is worth so much that it could be used for a
long time to come.”79 Recalling the two main uncertainties in ballistic theory (the
air resistance law F (v) and the air density law ∆(y)), Lebesgue stated that no
computation could compete with pure empiricism. Past experience during the war
had shown that the latter method was simpler, cheaper, and more efficient from a
military point of view.
Lebesgue’s poor opinion of the value of computational ballistics was formed
early on. Asked by Borel to get involved in both ballistics and sound-ranging stud-
ies, Lebesgue reluctantly agreed. “If this is useful to you, I am willing to do the
computations. But then you have to tell me explicitly and in detail the operations
I must carry out. I am willing to be a computing machine, but nothing less.” He
went on: “I will do the computations you ask in the manner of a stupid clerk;
but nothing more.”80 As a result of this episode, relations soured between Borel
and Lebesgue whose amour-propre seemed to have been hurt by Borel’s managerial
style. But I think that Lebesgue’s reluctance, which was due to many factors that
were deeply personal to him, was also the result of his very high ethical ground
which forbade him to take credit he did not believe his war work had earned him.
Lebesgue insisted that one should not put too much importance on the war contri-
bution of the “Sorbonnoids” at the Bureau des calculs of the Board of Invention.81
His reticence toward computational ballistics was rooted in his lack of satisfaction
with the experimental basis of theoretical ballistics. Distancing himself from many
mathematicians who had taken part in the war effort, he underscored that “math-
ematics cannot create the world.” In the absence of a solid experimental basis,
Lebesgue thought, the time was not ripe for mathematical ballistics.82
During the war and after, Lebesgue’s opinion about the value of the mathemat-
ical war effort varied little. He thought that in ballistics as well as in sound-ranging,
the physical problems overshadowed the mathematical effort. The only contribu-
tion mathematicians could make—and effectively made, according to him—was to
79“Mais il ne faudrait pas que la grandeur de l’effort accompli fasse croire que l’outil construit
a une valeur telle qu’on pourra l’employer encore longtemps.” [Academy of Sciences, Lebesgue
to Hadamard, October 23, 1919].
80“Si cela vous est utile, je veux bien faire des calculs. Mais alors dˆıtes-moi expresse´ment,
et dans le de´tail, les ope´rations que je dois faire. Je veux bien eˆtre une machine a` calcul, mais
rien de plus. . . . Je ferai donc les calculs que vous me demandez a` la fac¸on d’un bon employe´
idiot ; rien de plus” [Lebesgue 1991, letter CCXIII, n.d., pp. 318–319]. In this correspondence
with Borel, letters explicitly dealing war work are often undated; editors believe they can date
them from early 1915.
81Lebesgue to Borel, letter n.d. [April 1917], in [Lebesgue 1991, p. 339]. On the fate of
the friendship between Borel and Lebesgue during WWI, see He´le`ne Gispert’s contribution to
[Goldstein & Aubin forthcoming].
82“les mathe´matiques ne peuvent pas cre´er le monde ; qu’elles ne peuvent supple´er
l’expe´rience et l’observation mais, tout au plus, les re´sumer ; que le moment n’est donc pas
encore venu de faire de la balistique mathe´matique et que l’effort a faire actuellement est d’ordre
expe´rimental” [Academy of Sciences, Lebesgue to Hadamard, October 23, 1919].
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organize computing methods and their execution by technical assistants. How-
ever ingenious the methods developed during the war (although Lebesgue hardly
believed they were), this contribution would only last as long as deficient experi-
mental bases would—not very long, Lebesgue thought.
Hadamard shared Lebesgue’s opinion and was not overly impressed by the
mathematics and science coming out of war work. As most commentators, he
believed that the great scientific war was mostly one of the application of known
results rather than one of striking innovation. The ballistics papers he reviewed,
he wrote, “for the most part bring, not scientific improvements concerning the
principles, but rather modifications of a purely technical nature aimed at applying
these principles more or less easily in specific practical consequences. These are
topics with which the Academy wishes to remain involved, but that nonetheless are
on the sidelines of its proper function” [Hadamard 1920, p. 437].
Conclusion
Our study has shown that, although it was not always trivial, the mathematics
of ballistics was, for the most part, tedious. Mathematicians at Gaˆvre did work
on topics that had some wider implications, but, for the most part, they were
involved in menial tasks of experimentation, computation, and education. Still,
their contribution to the war effort was significant, useful, and perhaps crucial to
the final victory—and it was recognized as such. Ballisticians could legitimately
pride themselves on having been able to use mathematicians’ special abilities to
their own ends.
Many prominent mathematicians were involved in ballistics during the war.
To Lebesgue, Hadamard, Montel, and Drach already mentioned, we may add Ar-
naud Denjoy who worked on the solubility of the hodograph at Gaˆvre in July 1917,
Ernest Vessiot, later to succeed Borel as Director of the E´cole normale supe´rieure,
and Rene´ Garnier who taught at the Sorbonne after the war. But the result was
paradoxical. They were happy to close the parenthesis and leave behind the work
that had seemed most useful from a ballistics standpoint, as it had seemed to them
rather trivial from a mathematical point of view. But of Drach’s and Montel’s
work, most admired by Hadamard and which led to further work in the abstract
theory of differential equations after the war, Charbonnier bluntly wrote: “this
conquest, which honors the mathematicians, does not seem susceptible of provid-
ing ballisticians with new resources in view of applications” [Charbonnier 1928b,
p. 574].
Yet, one wonders whether the ballistics experience of some French mathemati-
cians and physicists did not have a deeper influence on the work they later did.
Most mathematicians who were active at Gaˆvre indeed kept their connection to
the military research institution. In 1921, civilians joined the Commission for the
first time since He´lie. Several mathematicians were nominated including Haag,
Chaˆtelet, Valiron, and Joseph Kampe´ de Fe´riet by then at the University of Lille.
Some pure mathematicians never returned to their earlier concerns. Haag later
became the director of the chronometric school in Besanc¸on and produced some of
the most important work in France on the theory of dynamical systems. Joining
the Lille faculty, Kampe´ de Fe´riet became a specialist in fluid mechanics and a
world leader in turbulence studies after World War II. Also at Lille, Chaˆtelet was
so invested in the institutional rebuilding of his university that his mathematical
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research in number theory and algebra begun before the war was relegated to a
minor place [Goldstein 2009]. The style of mathematical research this generation
of mathematicians perpetuated was characterized by very formal approaches to
problems directly inspired by applications.83 Although they were pushed aside
by the turbulent Bourbaki generation, these mathematicians planted the seeds of
applied mathematics research in France.
Abbreviations
• ALVF: Artillerie lourde sur voie ferre´e (Heavy Artillery on Rail).
• CRAS: Comptes rendus hebdomadaires des se´ances de l’Acade´mie des sci-
ences.
• GHM: Garnier–Haag–Marcus (ballistic computing method).
• MTAG: Mission du tir ae´rien de Gaˆvre (Gaˆvre’s Mission for Air Firing).
• MBTA: Mission balistique du tir ae´rien (Air Firing Ballistic Mission).
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